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Temporal Discounting and Gambling: A Meaningful Relationship?
Jeffrey N. Weatherly

University of North Dakota
Pathological gambling is an important and large societal problem. Theorists and
researchers have linked pathological gambling to rates of temporal discounting,
although not all attempts to do so have been successful. Unfortunately, popular
measures of temporal discounting each have weaknesses, and studies of discounting have tended to focus on one particular commodity – hypothetical monetary rewards. Evidence exists to suggest that problem and pathological gambling is also linked to escape contingencies. If so, these findings could potentially explain the link that has been found between temporal discounting and
gambling. Implications and predictions of this possibility are discussed.
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________________________________

Pathological gambling is a large societal
problem, with around 2% of the adult population displaying the disorder and an additional 5 – 8% displaying sub-clinical symptoms (i.e., problem gambling; Petry, 2005).
According to Petry (2005), there are six
known risk factors associated with pathological gambling. One is gender, with males
displaying the disorder significantly more
frequently than females. Another is ethnicity, with higher rates of pathological gambling being found in minority populations
than in the majority population. The third is
age, with young adults being most likely to
display pathological gambling and the likelihood of the disorder decreasing with age.
The fourth factor is socio-economic status.
Those low in socio-economic status are
more likely to be pathological gamblers than
are those high in socio-economic status.
The penultimate factor is marital status, with
pathological gamblers more likely to be single or divorced than be married. The final,
and by far the biggest, risk factor is drug use

and abuse. The comorbidity rate of substance dependence and pathological gambling is so high that it is recommended that
mental-health-care professionals working
with one population screen for the other disorder (Petry, 2005).
These factors are not the only ones that
have garnered research attention in the study
of gambling, however. Other factors have
included psychological disorders (e.g., depression; Dannewitz & Weatherly, 2007) or
personality characteristics (e.g., sensation
seeking; Gillis, McDonald, & Weatherly,
2008). A factor that has received a great
deal of research attention is the rate of temporal discounting (see Petry & Madden,
2010). Temporal discounting occurs when
the subjective value of an outcome or consequence (e.g., a sum of money) is lessened
because it is delayed in time. Phrased differently, individuals will typically take less
than the full amount of the outcome or consequence in order to get it immediately rather than having to wait for the full amount
(e.g., Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003), with
the amount that is acceptable immediately
decreasing as the delay to the full amount
increases (e.g., Smith & Hantula, 2008).
Research on temporal discounting has found
that pathological gamblers discount hypo-
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thetical monetary rewards to a greater degree than do their non-pathological counterparts (e.g., Dixon, Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006;
Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003).
The idea that temporal discounting may
play a role in the development and maintenance of pathological gambling is not new
(e.g., Fantino & Stolarz-Fantino, 2008; and
see Petry, 2005, for a review) nor is the potential application of discounting isolated to
gambling (e.g., see Rachlin, 1997). In fact,
Weatherly and Dixon (2007) made temporal
discounting an integral component of their
behavioral model of gambling. Specifically,
they argued that certain of the risk factors
for pathological gambling (described above)
could serve as setting events or establishing
operations, thus altering the subjective value
of money. When the value of money is altered, you would expect to get changes in
how money is discounted when it is delayed
in time. According to Weatherly and Dixon
(2007), those changes would ultimately lead
the gambler down the road of pathology.
After proposing this model, our laboratory set about testing its premises and predictions. To some extent, the results from
those attempts supported the model. For
instance, Weatherly, Marino, Ferraro, and
Slagle (2008) recruited non-pathological individuals across a wide age range to participate in a laboratory gambling study. Participants completed a number of paperpencil measures, including a temporaldiscounting task. They were then staked
with $10 in tokens that could be gambled,
across a 15-min session, on a slot machine.
The results showed that the only significant
predictor of how many tokens the participants gambled across the session was the
rate of discounting they had displayed on the
temporal-discounting task. The other factors
(gender, age, annual income) were not related to rates of gambling. Thus, this study
became the first to demonstrate that rates of
discounting were predictive of actual gam-
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bling behavior (vs. self reports or hypothetical situations). Furthermore, the results
were observed in non-pathological participants, suggesting that the relationship between gambling and temporal discounting
did not require the presence of pathology.
Other research, however, was not so
supportive. For instance, Weatherly, Derenne, and Chase (2008) investigated the idea
that the risk factors for gambling would be
related to temporal discounting. Specifically, they collected demographic information from 236 college students who then
completed a temporal discounting task, the
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS),
which measures lifetime gambling behavior
(Lesieur & Blume, 1987), and the Gambling
Functional Assessment (GFA), which measures the contingencies that maintain gambling behavior (Dixon & Johnson, 2007).
The study was designed to test the following
predictions: that the risk factors for gambling would be related to rates of temporal
discounting, that rates of temporal discounting would be related to the extent to which
people displayed symptoms of pathological
gambling (as measured by the SOGS), and
that whether or not peoples’ gambling behavior was maintained by monetary consequences would be related to both symptoms
of gambling problems and rates of temporal
discounting. However, none of these predictions were supported.
The value of the data reported by Weatherly, Derenne, and Chase (2008) was not
necessarily related to the association between temporal discounting and gambling
behavior. Rather, the interesting outcome in
their study was the temporal-discounting
data themselves. Their study employed a
paper-pencil, binary-choice temporal-discounting task in which participants were
asked a series of questions that required
them to choose between two monetary options (i.e., $1,000 available after a delay or a
lesser amount available immediately). With
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this procedure, rate of temporal discounting
is determined by identifying the point at
which, at each different delay, the participant switches from preferring the full, but
delayed amount to preferring the lesser,
more immediate amount. To minimize the
number of questions that needed to be asked,
and to combat order effects, the temporaldiscounting questions were randomized.
Thus, from question to question, participants
were presented with changes in both the delay to the full amount and the size of the
immediately available amount.
Despite the scientifically sound practice
of randomization, this manipulation wreaked
havoc with the data. Specifically, nearly
65% of the sample displayed multiple switch
points at at least one delay. For instance, at
a delay of one month, a person might in one
question choose $900 rather than waiting for
$1,000, but when faced with another question (later in the survey) choose to wait the
month to get the $1,000 rather than accepting $950 immediately. When this inconsistency occurs, the researcher is faced with a
number of decisions. For one, did these participants understand the task or take it seriously? If not, then perhaps their data should
be discarded. If there is no reason to believe
that the data were corrupt in some way, then
how does one go about estimating or determining what the indifference point should be
when there are multiple switch points? Ultimately, three different data sets were constructed; one that included only participants
who did not display multiple switchovers, a
second that included participants who made
one or less multiple switchovers, and a third
that included participants who made two or
less multiple switchovers. When a multiple
switchover did occur at a particular delay,
the indifference point for that delay was determined as the midpoint between the two
switch points.
The ultimate conclusion that could be
drawn from the data from Weatherly, Der-

Published by theRepository at St. Cloud State, 2010

29

enne, and Chase (2008) was that temporal
discounting varied systematically across the
three data sets. Specifically, the rate of temporal discounting became increasingly
steeper as participants who had made multiple switchovers were added to the data set.
Given that these were potentially the individuals who did not understand the task or
take it seriously, that their discounting rates
were determined partially by estimations
based on their multiple switchover responses, and the fact that pathological gambling is related to steeper rates of temporal
discounting, these results were rather disconcerting.
Measures of Temporal Discounting
Several different methods exist to
measure temporal discounting. One popular
technique, and the one employed by Weatherly, Derenne, and Chase (2008), is to fit the
indifference (i.e., switchover) points to a
hyperbolic equation (Mazur, 1987):
V = A / (1 + kD) (Equation 1)
When using Equation 1, V represents
subjective value of the delayed consequence,
A represents the amount of the consequence,
D represents the delay, and k is a free parameter that describes the rate that temporal
discounting occurs. When Equation 1 is
used, k is employed as the dependent measure for discounting with higher values of k
being indicative of steeper rates of discounting. Phrased differently, previous research
has shown that pathological gamblers display higher k values than non-pathological
gamblers (e.g., Dixon et al., 2003).
A second technique for measuring temporal discounting is to determine the area
under the curve (AUC) created by the indifference points across delays and assuming
that the commodity is at its full value when
there is no delay (Myerson, Green, & Waru-
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sawitharana, 2001). The AUC can be calculated using the following equation:
(x2 – x1)[(y1 + y2)/2] (Equation 2)
When using Equation 2, AUC can vary
between 0.0 and 1.0, with the rate of temporal discounting being inversely related to
AUC value. Phrased differently, if pathological gamblers discount more than nonpathological gamblers, then one would expect them to display lower AUC values than
non-pathological gamblers.
Although other formulas have been
proposed to measure temporal discounting
(e.g., Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; and see
Killen, 2009, for a discussion), Equations 1
and 2 are commonly found in discounting
studies. Each has their weaknesses. Equation 1 is, at best, an estimation of discounting and the processes that are involved in it.
That is, the resulting dependent measure, k,
is estimated given the responses the participant/subject provides, at which point the actual data are no longer considered. Studies
that employ Equation 1 therefore also report
how well it fit the data in terms of the variance for which it account (i.e., R2). Often
these values are quite high (e.g., Smith &
Hantula, 2008). However, sometimes they
are not (e.g., Weatherly, Derenne, & Terrell,
2010; Weatherly, Terrell, & Derenne, 2010).
Next, implicit in the use of Equation 1 is that
temporal discounting is hyperbolic in nature.
Although Equation 1 has adequately fit
many data sets in the literature, the theoretical reasons for why discounting should be
hyperbolic in nature have been elusive (see
Killeen, 2009, for a thorough discussion).
Furthermore, temporal discounting data
are not always that “clean.” Some participants do not decrease the value of the commodity as it is delayed (non-discounters;
e.g., see Beck & Triplett, 2009). Others
might in fact display the inverse of discounting (i.e., expecting more of the immediately
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available amount with increasing delays to
the full amount). A typical reaction to such
patterns of responding is to exclude them
from data analyses and it is common to see
10 – 15% of a data set excluded for this reason (e.g., see Beck & Triplett, 2009). This
practice is often done without much comment. An assumption is made that these individuals did not understand the task or
questions. However, one could argue that
these data are excluded because they do not
fit with the researchers’ assumptions, which
is troubling. Even if one could make a reasonable defense of this practice from a scientific basis, it is still troubling. If the relationship between pathological gambling and
temporal discounting is a meaningful one, it
seems odd that we should need to routinely
exclude 1 out of every 7 - 10 participants in
temporal discounting studies in our attempt
to explain the 1 in every 50 individuals who
suffer from the disorder.
AUC values, on the other hand, directly
represent the responses provided by the participants/subjects. It is also atheoretical in
terms of the form temporal discounting
should take. However, that is not necessarily a good thing. That is, it is potentially
possible for the responses of two individuals
to generate the same AUC value by displaying two distinctly different patterns of responding (e.g., one accepting increasingly
less of the commodity as it is delayed and
the other expecting increasingly more of the
commodity as it is delayed; and see Smith &
Hantula, 2008, for another example). Thus,
one cannot determine by looking at an AUC
value, as one can with a k value, the form of
the participant’s/subject’s responses.
It is also the case that, in typical studies
of temporal discounting, AUC values will be
highly correlated with participants’/subjects’
responses at long delays. Research on temporal discounting has historically found that
individuals display steep rates of discounting across short delays and discounting rates
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flatten at longer delays (the delay effect; see
Chapman, 1996, for a discussion). For this
reason, studies of temporal discounting often
have an overabundance of short delays and a
few long delays. Because discounting is
measured as a function of time, the long delays will constitute much of the overall AUC
value whereas each of the short delays will
potentially make up a lesser amount of the
AUC value. In other words, if one uses Equation 2 and AUC as the dependent measure
for temporal discounting, it is possible that
the delay effect may get masked.
Variations in Temporal Discounting Methodology and Interpretation
As noted above, the meaningfulness of
the relationship between temporal discounting and gambling has been driven by the
finding that rates of discounting have been
shown to differ as a function of gambling
status (e.g., Dixon et al., 2003, 2006). These
studies have found greater rates of temporal
discounting in gamblers than in non gamblers. However, it is worth noting that the
opposite finding has also been reported
(Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003).
One issue that has not received much, if
any, research attention is the commodity that
the participants in these studies are asked to
discount. The commodity in these studies,
and most studies of temporal discounting in
general, is a hypothetical amount of money.
Two questions can be asked about this particular commodity. First, is discounting of
this particular commodity indicative of an
individual’s temporal discounting of all
commodities? Second, if the answer to the
first question is “no,” then is it the best
commodity to use in such studies?
The answer to the first question does
indeed appear to be “no.” Recent research
from our laboratory has asked just such a
question. Weatherly, Terrell, and Derenne
(2010) had 648 college students complete a
temporal-discounting task that included five
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commodities. There were two sets of commodities (two monetary values, cigarettes, a
dating partner, & one’s own body image or
two monetary values, retirement income,
medical treatment, and federal education
legislation). For both data sets, two outcomes were observed. First, significant differences in rates of discounting were observed across the five commodities (AUC
was the dependent measure because Equation 1 provided a poor fit to the data). Second, a factor analysis of each data set resulted in a two-factor solution. Germane to
the present topic, the monetary commodities
loaded on to one of the factors while other
commodities loaded on to a second, independent factor. Phrased differently, results
from both data sets indicated that knowing
how participants discounted money did not
provide the information necessary to predict
how they discounted all other commodities.
Given that rates of discounting hypothetical monetary rewards are not universally predictive of an individual’s rate of
discounting of all commodities, is the commodity of hypothetical monetary rewards
the one we should be studying? Here the
research literature is relatively silent (but see
Yi, Mitchell, & Bickel, 2010, for a discussion). As noted above, the majority of studies on discounting have used this particular
commodity. One could ask whether temporal discounting of hypothetical monetary
rewards is similar to temporal discounting of
real monetary rewards. Although it is impractical to use real monetary rewards of the
size typically used in studies that employ
hypothetical ones (e.g., $1,000) or use the
same time delays (e.g., 10 years), research
that has attempted to compare discounting of
real and hypothetical monetary rewards have
found similar rates of discounting between
the two (e.g., Dixon, Mui, Green, & Myerson, in press; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, &
Kastern, 2003). One might assume that because gamblers gamble money, that money
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is the correct commodity to study. That is,
however, an assumption. Future research is
needed to determine if temporal discounting
of other commodities might be just as
strongly, if not more strongly, associated
with gambling behavior as is that of hypothetical monetary amounts.
A related issue (and one that is beyond
the scope of the present discussion) is not
whether money is the correct commodity to
be studying, but rather whether temporal
discounting is the correct type of discounting to be studying. That is, probability and
temporal discounting are two potentially distinct phenomena (see Green & Myerson,
2004). Given that gambling involves risking
something of value on a probabilistic outcome, the field might be better served to
pursue the potential relationship between
probability discounting and gambling rather
than temporal discounting and gambling
(see Petry & Madden, 2010, or Weatherly &
Flannery, 2008, for a discussion).
Even if the study of temporal discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards turns
out to be the correct one in relationship to
gambling behavior, the relationship between
temporal discounting and gambling, as it
stands today, is a correlational one. That is,
studies that have shown a relationship between rates of temporal discounting and pathological gambling have done so in preexisting populations (e.g., pathological
gamblers). Thus, it is not possible to tell
whether changes in one’s gambling behavior
led to changes in temporal discounting,
whether changes in temporal discounting led
to changes in one’s gambling behavior, or
whether both phenomena are related to some
third, yet unidentified, factor or process.
Now for Something Slightly Different
Dixon and Johnson (2007) proposed the
GFA. The GFA is a paper-pencil measure
intended to identify the contingency that is
maintaining a person’s gambling behavior.
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It was adapted from a similar measure that
was designed to measure self-injurious behavior (Durand & Crimmins, 1988) and
represents the first functional-assessment
tool created for gambling behavior. It attempts to identify four maintaining consequences for gambling: tangible (i.e., money), social attention, sensory experience, and
escape. There are 20 questions total, with
five questions associated with each of the
four consequences. The respondent can endorse each question from 0 (never) to 6 (always). Summing the scores of all responses
gives one a total score on the GFA (maximum = 120). Summing the scores in each
category is intended to identify the primary
maintaining contingency (i.e, the consequence receiving the highest score; maximum = 30 for each consequence).
Miller, Meier, Muehlenkamp, and Weatherly (2009) attempted to test the validity of
the GFA by giving it to 949 undergraduate
students. This sample was randomly divided into two groups, one on which an exploratory factor analysis was conducted and
the second on which a confirmatory factor
analysis was conducted. The results of both
analyses were similar. Although the GFA
was designed to identify four possible maintaining contingencies for gambling, both
analyses identified only two factors. Factor
loadings for the individual items on the GFA
grouped in a logical fashion. Those items
intended to measure tangible, social attention, and sensory experience consequences
tended to load on one factor, which was labeled positive reinforcement. Those items
intended to measure escape loaded on the
second factor, which was labeled negative
reinforcement. Thus, although the GFA was
designed to identify four separate contingencies, these data suggested that it, in fact,
measured only two.
Further analysis of the data, however,
revealed a potentially intriguing finding. If
one looked at the respondents’ factor scores
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on the two factors, a distinct linear pattern
was observed for both. As one’s total score
on the GFA increased, one’s factor one
score (i.e., positive reinforcement) increased
accordingly. This result was not necessarily
surprising given that the majority of the
questions on the GFA were related to factor
one. Thus, if one scored high on the GFA
overall, one would expect to see high scores
on factor one. However, the same result was
not observed for factor two (negative reinforcement). For both males and females in
both the exploratory and confirmatory data
sets, as overall scores on the GFA increased,
scores on factor two tended to be zero.
However, there were a number of outliers.
The intriguing finding was the placement of
those outliers. Participants who scored high
on factor two also tended to be the individuals who scored quite high on the GFA overall. In other words, those who gambled as
an escape tended to score high on the measure as a whole. Our question was whether
these individuals were potentially the problem or pathological gamblers in the data set?
To test this possibility, Miller, Dixon,
Parker, Kulland, and Weatherly (this issue)
administered the GFA and the SOGS (Lesieur & Blume, 1987) to 204 people on the
streets of Las Vegas and Wendover, Nevada
and to 101 people in two sports bars in
Rockford, Illinois. The SOGS is the most
widely used screening measure for the potential presence of pathological gambling,
with a score of 5 or more on the SOGS indicative of the potential presence of pathology. The question was whether scores in the
escape category on the GFA would identify
those individuals who scored 5 or more on
the SOGS. Using an overall score of 8 or
more in the escape category as the cutoff,
the GFA correctly identified individuals
scoring 5 or more on the SOGS in 20% of
the cases in the Nevada sample and in over
50% of the cases in Illinois sample. Thus,
although the GFA was designed to measure
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the consequences that maintain gambling
behavior, it also appears to do a decent job
as a diagnostic tool. If one scores high in
the escape category of the GFA, then it
would be wise to screen the person for pathological gambling.
What Does This Information Have to do
With Temporal Discounting?
The data from Miller et al. (2009, this
issue) suggest that, at least for a fair number
of potential pathological gamblers, the contingency maintaining their gambling behavior is negative reinforcement (i.e., escape).
That connection should not be overly surprising given that gambling as an escape is
an official symptom of pathological gambling (American Psychiatric Association,
2003). The connection between pathological gambling, gambling as an escape, and
temporal discounting, however, may not be
as clear.
Research on temporal discounting has
shown a finding that has come to be known
as the magnitude effect (e.g., Chapman,
1996; Thaler, 1981). Specifically, the greater the size or value of the full commodity,
the less participants/subjects tend to discount it when it is delayed. For example,
you might be willing to accept $900 today
rather than waiting one year for $1,000.
However, you might be unwilling to accept
$90,000 today and instead wait a year to get
$100,000. Thus, although the rate of discounting in the former example is at least
10% over a year, when the magnitude of the
commodity is increased (i.e., the latter example) the discounting rate is less than 10%.
For this reason, rates of temporal discounting have also been used as a means for measuring the subjective value of a particular
commodity (e.g., Weatherly, Derenne, &
Terrell, 2010).
If problem and pathological gamblers
differ from their non-problem and nonpathological counterparts in the reason why
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they are gambling, then finding differences
in how they temporally discount money
would be expected. That is, if someone is
gambling for a reason other than winning
money, then it would seem to be a reasonable assumption that winning money holds
less subjective value for this person than it
does for someone who is gambling for
monetary gain. Likewise, if monetary gain
holds less value for this individual than it
does for another, one would expect a greater
rate of temporal discounting for hypothetical
monetary rewards for this individual than for
another.
Thus, is there a relationship between
gambling and temporal discounting? The
answer is likely “yes.” Is it a meaningful
relationship? The answer to that question is
less clear. For some individuals, it might
indeed be a meaningful relationship. However, for others, the relationship may be the
outcome of a third, independent factor or
process. That is, pathological gamblers do
not hold in high value (at least relative to
non-pathological gamblers) the commodity
that researchers are using in their studies of
temporal discounting.
PREDICTIONS
The present idea would seem to be consistent with existing data. Clearly, however,
its predictions need to be tested before it is
accepted. Below three predictions are outlined that could potentially support or disconfirm the argument made in the present
paper.
First, gambling behavior should be related to one’s escape score on the GFA. As
noted above, Weatherly, Marino, Ferraro,
and Slagle (2008) demonstrated that participants’ gambling on a slot machine was predicted by their rate of temporal discounting.
They did not specifically test, however,
whether escape scores on the GFA were
equally or more predictive. If rates of temporal discounting by pathological gamblers
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are being lowered indirectly because they
are gambling as an escape, then it would be
reasonable to predict that rates and levels of
gambling would be at least as, if not more
highly, correlated with escape scores on the
GFA than with rates of temporal discounting.
Second, pathological gamblers will not
always display greater rates of temporal discounting than non gamblers. The current
argument is that most studies of temporal
discounting have employed hypothetical
monetary amounts as the commodity and
this commodity might have a lowered value
for pathological gamblers if they are indeed
gambling as an escape. If this argument is
correct, a temporal-discounting study that
employs a commodity that potentially serves
as an escape (e.g., winning a video game or
a trip to a theme park, both of which could
provide competing forms of escape) may
find that pathological gamblers discount that
commodity less than non gamblers because
that commodity would hold a greater subjective value to them than for non gamblers.
Third, for individuals whose pathological gambling is maintained by escape, therapies that involve finding alternative mechanisms to achieve that escape may prove successful in treating their gambling. However,
if that is the case, you would not necessarily
expect to eliminate the difference observed
between that person’s temporal discounting
of hypothetical monetary rewards relative to
his/her non-pathological counterpart because
finding an alternative escape contingency
would not address/alter the subjective value
of money for that person.
CONCLUSION
Is the relationship between temporal
discounting and gambling a meaningful
one? It may be. Certainly, there are many
researchers out there, including myself (e.g.,
Weatherly & Dixon, 2007), who have argued that it is. However, the results are not
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universally supportive of the idea, our techniques for studying temporal discounting
have not been perfected or extensively explored, and it remains to be determined
whether we are even pursuing the correct
type of discounting when it comes to studying gambling. Furthermore, I have attempted to outline a scenario in which the
relationship between temporal discounting
and gambling is related to a third factor or
process. With all of the emphasis one can
find on temporal discounting in the literature
today, the field would be sage to give at
least as much attention to the possibility that
the relationship is perhaps less meaningful
than once thought as it does to the possibility that the relationship is in fact a meaningful one.
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